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Book Reviews 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR 
ON TERRORISM. By Geoffrey R. Stone.1 New York. 
W.W. Norton and Company. 2004. Pp. 730 + xx. $ 35.00. 
Michael Kent Curtis2 
OVERVIEW 
Geoffrey R. Stone has written a long and important book 
on free speech in wartime. The book proceeds chronologically 
from the "half war" with France and the Sedition Act of 1798, 
through the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Cold 
"War," the Vietnam War, and a very brief discussion of the 
"War" on Terror. A few wars get short shrift, such as the War of 
1812 and the Mexican War. But Professor Stone discusses the 
free speech issues in the wars he covers in admirable detail. 
Stone not only discusses historic episodes. He also discusses 
constitutional questions the episodes raise, both in terms of past 
and present legal understandings. By looking at the past in light 
of free speech and other legal doctrines Stone often illuminates 
both the past and the law. For example, Stone discusses the case 
of Clement Vallandigham who was arrested for making an anti-
war speech in Ohio. Lincoln defended the arrest by asking, 
"must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I 
must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to de-
sert?" (p. 111). Stone notes that Lincoln's claim is dubious in 
light of current free speech doctrine: ordinarily people may not 
be reduced to reading or hearing material suitable for the sim-
ple-minded {pp. 110-11). Similarly, Stone looks at prosecutions 
for attempting to cause insubordination or refusal to serve in the 
I. Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chi-
cago. 
2. Judge Donald L. Smith Professor of Public and Constitutional Law, Wake Forest 
University School of Law. 
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armed forces in light of the general law of attempt as it existed at 
the time. He also looks at scholarly criticism written at the time 
(e.g., pp. 161, 163, 175, 179). 
Occasionally, the book moves beyond war a~1d free speech 
to related issues. For example, it covers the incarceration of 
American citizens and non-citizens of Japanese descent during 
World War II, and the substantial deprivations of fair process in 
the case of the thousands of people forced out of federal em-
ployment in the government's Cold War loyalty program. Stone 
looks not only at statutes and prosecutions, but also at wider 
phenomena, such as criticism in the Illinois legislature of the 
University of Chicago for allowing a student Communist group 
to exist. Robert Hutchins, the president of the University, is one 
of a number of leaders in the struggle for freedom of discussion 
whose brief biographies enrich the book. 
Some readers will find some of the stories familiar. I learned 
much from Professor Stone's discussion of World Wars I and II, 
the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. In any case, Professor 
Stone's object is not simply to write a monograph for law profes-
sors and historians on hitherto obscure free speech episodes. He 
seeks a far wider audience. He hopes the larger story he tells will 
contribute to the defense of liberty. 
Because the protection of liberty ultimately "lies in the hearts 
of men and women," citizens must understand and internalize 
the value of civil liberties and the need-indeed, the duty-to 
tolerate and even to consider dissenting views. They must ap-
preciate why civil liberties matter and why they have a re-
sponsibility to protect them. They must understand that even 
well-meaning individuals are tempted to do things under the 
influence of mob mentality that "they would be entirely 
ashamed to do on their own." (p. 536). 
His basic point is surely right. In the long run, the Court re-
flects dominant political views. At their best, courts can cabin 
bigotry3 and check hysteria4 in the short run. Whether they 
should do so, and if so when, is the subject of a raging political 
debate today. Still, if dominant political views are and remain 
hostile to strong constitutional protection for dissent or other 
claims of liberty, those claims will not fare well in the courts. 
3. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
4. E.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
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On that score, reading Perilous Times can be discouraging 
at times-even from a short run perspective. Congress passed, 
the President signed, and the courts enthusiastically enforced the 
Sedition Act of 1798. In effect, the Sedition Act made "false" 
opinions about President Adams or the Federalist Congress a 
crime. At the same time, the Sedition Act left Vice President 
Thomas Jefferson (Adams' expected opponent in the upcoming 
presidential election) without any legal protection against the 
slings and arrows of outraged Federalists. During the Civil War, 
Union General Ambrose Burnside arrested Democrat Clement 
Vallandigham for making an anti-war speech and tried and con-
victed him before a military commission. This act was ratified by 
President Lincoln. During World War I, dissenters were given 
long jail sentences for political opposition to the war and the 
draft, and the courts generally upheld the convictions. At least, 
as Stone points out, the victims of the Sedition Act could only 
get two years in jail. In World War I, sentences between ten and 
twenty years were typical. World War II saw the incarceration of 
the Japanese for the duration of the war. 
Professor Stone chronicles First Amendment casualties in 
the Cold War in considerable detail. At the loyalty hearings, the 
accused employee had a right to counsel, but not to confront his 
accuser or even to know the accuser's identity. At hearings, peo-
ple were asked how many times they had voted for Henry Wal-
lace. Wallace was the Democratic vice presidential candidate in 
1940 and the Progressive Party candidate in 1948; in 1948, the 
American Communist Party endorsed Wallace. People were also 
asked if they had read novels by Howard Fast or listened to re-
cords by Paul Robeson and what their feelings were about racial 
equality (p. 346). 
Only during the Vietnam War did the Court substantially 
protect anti-war dissent. In his conclusion Professor Stone asks, 
"Can we do better?" In light of this rather dismal record, it is a 
pertinent question. 
Still, as Stone makes clear, the picture is more complex than 
the preceding paragraph suggests. Thomas Jefferson won the 
election of 1800, the Sedition Act expired, Jefferson pardoned 
the violators, and Congress eventually repaid the fines. During 
the Civil War, some Republicans as well as abolitionists joined 
Democrats in protesting suppression of anti-war speech. The 
protest helped to contain repression. {The Civil War Congress 
also passed legislation that attempted to limit military arrests 
and military trials of civilians in non-combat areas, but the Lin-
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coln administration ignored the law.5) Stone shows that the Con-
gress debated the World War I Acts used to punish speech and 
made serious attempts to limit their scope. But the courts, swept 
away by the "riptide of war fever" (p. 179), generally ignored the 
limited readings they could reasonably have given to the acts 
(pp. 146-180). While President Roosevelt asked his Attorneys 
General for Smith Act prosecutions on the eve of World War II, 
his Attorneys General were unenthusiastic and only a few prose-
cutions emerged (pp. 252-55). 
According to Stone, "it is often repeated as a form of con-
ventional wisdom that the Supreme Court will not decide a case 
against the government on an issue of military security during a 
period of national emergency" (p. 549). Supporters of the claim 
cite decisions like the ones upholding the incarceration of the 
Japanese in Korematsu6 and the conviction of officials of the 
Communist Party in Dennis.7 Stone insists that this "does not 
give the Court its due" because there "are many counter exam-
ples" (pp. 549-50). He lists a number, including cases that up-
held First Amendment rights of American fascists and Commu-
nists in a series of criminal prosecutions and denaturalization 
proceedings during World War II and the Barnette decision pro-
tecting the right of pacifist Jehovah Witness children not to sa-
lute the flag in 1943 (p. 550). 
Though it came out too late for inclusion in his book, the 
Supreme Court decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld8 is an additional 
example. There the Court held that the president may not uni-
laterally imprison American citizens as "enemy combatants" and 
deny them any access to counsel or to a hearing to determine 
guilt. The majority provided significant protection, though it fell 
short of the robust, historic protections Justice Scalia would have 
accorded- absent congressional suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus.9 Still, it substantially limited the President's claim to uni-
lateral power. 
5. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE:" 
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 307, 339 (2000) 
(hereinafter, CURTIS, FREE SPEECH]. 
6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
7. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
8. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
9. Id. at 2660 (Scalia, 1., dissenting). 
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LESSONS FROM THE PAST? 
For those concerned with maintenance of free speech and 
civil liberty in periods of crisis, Perilous Times provides vicarious 
experience from history and subjects that experience to legal 
analysis. There are lessons one might draw from this vicarious 
experience. Some are depressingly current. 
1. Hysteria distorts the law and the Constitution and under-
mines free speech. 
The first lesson is one emphasized by Justice Robert H. 
Jackson: while power to wage war is essential, it is also especially 
dangerous to liberty. As Jackson wrote in 1948, the war power is 
"the most dangerous one to free government in the whole cata-
logue of powers."10 He explained that this was because it 
usually is invoked in haste and excitement when calm legisla-
tive consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is 
executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes moderation 
unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by judges under 
the influence of the same passions and pressures. Always ... 
the Government urges hasty decision to forestall some emer-
gency ... and pleads that paralysis will result if its claims to 
d . d II power are eme .... 
Perilous Times documents recurring triumphs of hysteria. 
For example, in passing the Sedition Act, Federalists saw (or 
said they saw) a conspiracy to ruin the government by false 
statements (pp. 36-38). During World War I, courts upheld long 
prison sentences for express and even implied criticism of the 
war and draft. Even a movie about the American Revolution 
landed its producer in jail because it portrayed atrocities by Brit-
ish soldiers. (In World War I, the British were our allies). When 
representatives of the National Civil Liberties Bureau went to 
officials in the Wilson administration to plead for restoration of 
mailing privileges for The Masses and other journals, the admini-
stration responded by denying mailing privileges to the National 
Civil Liberties Bureau itself. The publications the administration 
banned included the Bureau's pamphlet on free speech (p. 183). 
With implicit support from the government, "private" organiza-
tions engaged in break-ins, bugging offices, searches of bank and 
medical records aimed at Americans of German descent. Vigi-
lantes ransacked homes, tarred and feathered, whipped a minis-
10. Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J. concurring). 
II. /d. 
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ter before he could speak to an anti-war rally, and also murdered 
people (p. 157). 
Another example of hysteria was the incarceration of the 
Japanese. Although no acts of espionage or sabotage were 
documented and military leaders said the danger of a Japanese 
invasion was quite remote, advocates from General John DeWitt 
to columnist Walter Lippmann called for incarcerating the Japa-
nese. They did so although the FBI had already rounded up 
those it considered dangerous and said it had the situation well 
in hand. Remarkably, Lippmann and DeWitt treated the ab-
sence of any acts of sabotage or espionage as proof of a disci-
plined conspiracy just waiting for the right moment to strike (pp. 
292-94). Roosevelt followed the General's advice. 
2. Meaningful democracy requires free speech, especially in 
wartime. 
Stone's account lets us hear from Congressmen, Senators, 
lawyers, and others involved in these free speech controversies. 
One theme is the centrality of free speech for democracy. Here, 
for example, is Stone's account of Gilbert Roe, attorney for the 
Free Speech League, arguing before a congressional committee 
against suppression of dissent during World War 1: 
Roe noted that "the people ... retain their right at the next 
election to return to Congress Senators and Representa-
tives ... who are opposed to the continuation of the war." 
How, he asked the committee, is any voter "to form an intelli-
gent opinion" on this question "unless there is the fullest dis-
cussion permitted of every phase of the war, its origin, its 
manner of prosecution, and its manner of termination? (p. 
150, ellipses in original). 
3. The idea that the opposition is loyal (though misguided), a 
central tenant of democratic government, is often threat-
ened in wartime. 
Accepting the opposition as legitimate and loyal is crucial 
for healthy democracy. If one's opponents are not only misled, 
but disloyal enemies of the nation, then extreme measures to 
suppress them seem justified. Federalists saw political opposition 
as a dangerous Jeffersonian conspiracy to destroy the nation. 
Jeffersonian Republicans (correctly) insisted that their criticism 
was simply the democratic process at work. As Republican Al-
bert Gallatin noted, the "dangerous 'conspiracy'" charged by the 
Federalists consisted of speeches and writings "expressing an 
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opinion that certain measures of Government have been dic-
tated by an unwise policy, or by improper motives, and that 
some of them were unconstitutional" (p. 38). Gallatin rejected 
the claim that Republican criticism of the Adams administration 
"is seditious, is an enemy, not of the Administration, but of the 
Constitution" (p. 38). Such a claim, Gallatin noted, is "subver-
sive of the Constitution" (p. 38). This third lesson-the attack on 
the democratic concept of a loyal opposition-is inextricably 
linked to a fourth. 
4. Politicians use the crisis in an effort to entrench themselves 
and destroy their political opponents. 
Political leaders often exploit a crisis in an effort to elimi-
nate the opposition and to entrench themselves. Since democ-
racy requires a healthy opposition and the democratic rationale 
for free speech involves the importance of multiple perspectives, 
silencing the opposition or dissenters is a bad thing. For exam-
ple, the Federalists attempted to use the undeclared war with 
France to destroy the Jeffersonian party and to entrench them-
selves in power (p. 34). During the Cold War, the chairman of 
the Republican National Committee announced that the "De-
mocratic party policy... bears a made-in-Moscow label" 
(p. 312) and Richard Nixon described the Democratic Party as 
the "party of communism" and described President Truman and 
Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson as "traitors" 
(p. 339). 
5. The dangers of hysteria and political abuse provide cogent 
arguments for a strong version of the clear and present dan-
ger test. 
Today, as during other times of crisis, we are tempted tore-
lax speech protective tests such as that in Brandenburg v. Ohio12 
to one more like the test of the Dennis plurality. Stone asks if we 
can act against a 90% chance of a smaller evil by suppressing 
speech, why should we not be able to act against 1% chance of a 
far greater evil (p. 409). His answer is that a close temporal con-
nection increases confidence that the prediction of serious harm 
has some validity (p. 409). 
It is difficult to predict future events. As a general rule, the 
farther out in the future the event, the less confident we can 
be of our predictions. Insisting on a close temporal connection 
between speech and harm increases our confidence that the 
12. 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
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prediction has some validity. Moreover, in a free society the 
suppression of speech should be a last, not a first, resort. 
Unless the feared harm is imminent, and there is no alterna-
tive to restricting speech, the government should use other 
methods to prevent the harm. The temptation to suppress dis-
sident speech on the pretext or the honest, but mistaken, be-
lief that it is dangerous is both natural and pervasive. Insisting 
on a close temporal connection and a high likelihood of seri-
ous harm assures us that the danger and not abhorrence of the 
ideas that is driving the government's action (p. 409). 
Strong protection for speech does not, Stone emphasizes 
again and again, leave the government impotent. It simply re-
quires that it target the crimes and harms rather than dissenting 
speech. 
The other approach, of course, is some variation of the bad 
tendency test. As one court put it, speakers must be held respon-
sible for the "natural and probable tendency and effect" of their 
words. By this view, attacking the wisdom or justice of the war 
would undermine the war effort by "undermining the spirit of 
loyalty" (p. 171 ). As one commentator at the time noted, the 
shrewd among those who wish to undermine the war effort could 
pose as attempting to influence public opinion to change the law. 
By that view, the harm in suppressing some democratic discus-
sion was outweighed by the harm to the war effort from allowing 
such criticism (p. 219). 
6. Laws and Constitutions Are Not Enough. It matters who we 
have in positions of power. 
A government of laws, not of men, is a cherished ideal. But 
as Jerome Frank once wrote, it is also an impossible one. We 
need instead, he said, a government of the right sort of laws en-
forced by the right sort of people. 13 
Perilous Times highlights again and again the importance of 
the people chosen to enforce the laws. In spite of failures and 
shortcomings, civil liberty and free speech fared far better, he 
suggests, because of Attorneys General such as Gerald Ford's 
Edward Levi, and Franklin Roosevelt's Francis Biddle, Frank 
Murphy, and Robert Jackson. Stone also gives us brief and mov-
ing portraits of the legislators and lower court judges who swam 
against the current of repression during World War I, for exam-
13. JEROME FRANK, GOVERNMENT IS HUMAN, in JEROME FRANK, A MAN'S 
REACH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE JEROME FRANK 84 (Barbara Fra!lk Kristein, ed., 
1965). 
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ple. Stone concludes that when national leaders did not whip up 
hysteria against dissent, free speech fared far better (pp. 533-34 ). 
SOME ADDITIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND 
RESERVATIONS 
There are more lessons one could draw from this fine and 
instructive book. Instead, I will express a few reservations. 
To a considerable extent, Stone views free speech through 
the lens of wars and the First Amendment. This is one of the 
book's virtues. It highlights many important parts of the picture, 
but like all perspectives leaves others in comparative darkness. 
Stone notes that "the First Amendment restricts only the gov-
ernment .... If Columbia University, a private institution, fires a 
teacher for being a member of the Socialist Party, its action does 
not violate the First Amendment. If a mob tars and feathers a 
speaker ... , it does not violate the Constitution" (p. 6). True 
enough. But some readers might draw the wrong conclusion. 
It is a mistake to confuse the First Amendment with free 
speech. The issue is difficult and paradoxical. Still, the claim that 
Columbia University and the mob in the hypothetical are un-
dermining free speech is important, legitimate, and often sub-
stantially correct-even though there is no federal judicial rem-
edy for a private attack on free speech.14 (There may be legal 
remedies for assault, breach of contract, etc.) 
If private suppression is sufficiently pervasive and persua-
sive, the government does not need to suppress. Private censors 
will do the work for it. Furthermore, the United States has a rich 
tradition of recognizing that mob attacks on speakers are an at-
tack on free speech and the constitutional rights of American 
citizens. The reaction to the killing of Elijah Lovejoy is one ex-
ample. Lovejoy was defending his anti-slavery press from the 
latest in a series of mobs that had destroyed his press.15 The 
Court's decision that Congress had no power under the Four-
teenth Amendment to punish private conspiracies motivated by 
the specific intent to silence opposition helped to hobble efforts 
to combat the Ku Klux Klan. 1 The result contributed to ena-
14. Compare United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) with United Brother-
hood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). 
15. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 5, at 216-27. 
16. See generally, ROBERT KACZOROWSKI, THE PoLmCS OF JUDICIAL lNTER-
PREr A TION: THE FEDERAL CoURTS, DEPARTMENT OF ]USilCE AND CiviL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 
chs. 7-9 (1985). For a brief discussion of the road not taken see Michael Kent Curtis, 
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bling one of the longest and most successful suppressions of the 
rights of free speech, voting, and association in American his-
tory. 
The caveat about ignoring "private" suppression as we 
evaluate free speech history relates to a second implication (and 
perhaps not an intended one) of the Stone book. It is that free 
speech has been safe most of the time, through most of our his-
tory. The real problems arise, Stone suggests, in wartime-
though Stone has wisely expanded what counts as a "war." "In 
peacetime, in times of relative tranquillity, which (by my count) 
make up roughly 80 percent of our history, the United States 
does not punish individuals for challenging government policies" 
(p. 5). 
What this perspective overlooks is a long history beginning 
with suppression of anti-slavery speech in the Southern states 
(before the Civil War) and continuing as "private" and public 
suppression for many years afterwards. At least from the 1830s 
through the Civil War, the Southern states, in effect, made it a 
crime to criticize the institution of slavery. By 1860 in North 
Carolina, uttering ideas that would have the tendency to make 
slaves or free blacks discontent (as most indictments of slavery 
would} was a felony punishable by death for the first offense. It 
was a felony for years before that. While Lincoln and Douglas 
did not agree on much in their famous 1858 debates, they agreed 
that Republicans could not campaign in the South. 17 The South-
em state laws were only the tip of the suppression iceberg. Mobs 
and vigilance committees enforced conformity. 
Closely related to the issue of the pervasiveness of suppres-
sion is the "rebound theory." By that theory, we suppress in 
times of crisis, but we soon rebound. First I will set out the re-
bound theory, then Stone's limited support of it, and then my 
reservations about his limited support. 
A recurring theme in disputes over free speech in times of 
crisis is the idea that we need not worry because the suppression 
is temporary and things will return to normal after the crisis 
ends. That claim was part of Abraham Lincoln's defense of the 
military arrest and trial of Democratic politician Clement Val-
John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets the "Lost 
Cause," 36 AKRON L. REv. 617, 652--661 (2003), part of a symposium at the University of 
Akron School of Law devoted to Bingham. 
17. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 5, at 282. 
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landigham for making an anti-war speech. "Nor am I able," 
Abraham Lincoln wrote, 
to appreciate the danger apprehended by [his critics] 
that the American people will, by means of military ar-
rests during the Rebellion, lose the right of Public Dis-
cussion, the Liberty of Speech and the Press, ... 
throughout the indefinite peaceful future ... any more 
than I am able to believe that a man could contract so 
strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness 
as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder 
of his healthful life (p. 112). 
Stone ultimately rejects the "don't worry, we rebound" ap-
proach. He notes that suppression of free speech in times of cri-
sis is a dramatic assault on civil liberty, even though the com-
mitment to free speech rebounds (p. 531). "To fight a war 
successfully, it is necessary for soldiers to risk their lives. But it is 
not necessarily necessary for others to surrender their freedoms. 
That necessity must be demonstrated, not merely presumed" (p. 
531). The claim, according to Stone, is particularly misguided 
where freedom of speech is involved because of the democratic 
right to make decisions related to the war (p. 531). 
Furthermore, Stone strongly rejects the idea that courts 
should simply defer to the president or congress in times of cri-
sis. He sees the idea of "judges as protectors of freedom" as a 
distinctive American contribution. Instead of deferring, Stone 
suggests the courts should "consciously construct constitutional 
doctrines that will provide firm and unequivocal guidance for 
later periods of stress" (p. 548). 
Still, in an admirable effort at objectivity, Stone notes that 
the "rebound" argument has something to be said for it-in the 
case of short wars. 
If rights, once lost, could not later be regained, then civil lib-
erties would be in a permanent downward spiral. But that is 
not the case. In fact, after each of our six episodes, the na-
tion's commitment to free speech rebounded, usually rather 
quickly, sometimes more robustly than before .... As long as 
wars are of reasonably limited duration, this is an important 
consideration in assessing the long-term dangers of suppress-
ing dissent in wartime (pp. 530-31). 
As Stone implicitly notes, the rationale is particularly dubi-
ous when applied to a "war" such as the "war" on terror which is 
likely to continue for many, many years. Beyond the ones Stone 
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notes, there are additional problems with the "don't worry, we 
always rebound" claim. I have reservations even about Stone's 
limited concession as to its merit. 
First, I am dubious about the idea of a self-contained short 
repression. The "temporary" suppression provides a precedent 
for the next crisis, as one can see comparing rationales in the 
Civil War and World War I. Lincoln's decision to ratify and de-
fend the military trial of Vallandigham for making an anti-war 
speech seems to have shaped the thinking of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in Schenck18 and Debs.19 Like Lincoln, Holmes em-
braced a "wartime is different" rationale for "temporary" sup-
pression of speech. Like Lincoln, Holmes embraced a bad ten-
dency rationale-the speech of a "wily agitator" must be 
suppressed because it can induce a "simple-minded soldier boy" 
to desert (p. 111). That was so, Lincoln asserted, even though 
Vallandigham did not "specifically and by direct language" ad-
vocate breaking the draft law. 
Stone has a more sympathetic account of Lincoln's view. 
According to Stone, Lincoln's view gave free scope for criticism 
so long as criticism was coupled with an admonition to obey the 
law (pp. 112-13). He derives this principle from the fact that Lin-
coln (inaccurately) said that Vallandigham was not arrested sim-
ply for making an anti-war speech and from the fact that Lincoln 
(inaccurately) claimed that Vallandigham did not counsel 
against law violation (pp. 113-14). 
If this makes Lincoln's justification for suppression of 
speech less objectionable, it leaves his approach to due process 
sadly inadequate. Lincoln justified the Vallandigham prosecu-
tion based on a crime with which Vallandigham was not charfled 
and for which no evidence was offered at his military "trial. "2 
One long-term problem with the rebound theory then is 
that it provides a suppression rationale for the next crisis, and 
crises are not rare events in human history. (One can think of 
the American South as being in a permanent state of crisis over 
slavery through the Civil War and in a race crisis for many years 
thereafter.) 
18. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
19. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
20. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 5, at 310-14 (the charge and evidence against 
Vallandigham); on the larger Vallandigham story, Lincoln's shifting position, and the 
effort to expel a Democratic representative from Congress for making an anti-war 
speech, see generally id. at 300-56. 
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There is a second additional problem with the rebound de-
fense for suppression. While Stone is right that free speech has 
often recovered rather quickly from temporary suppression (at 
least since the 1930s), it is also true that it often has not. That is 
so, at least, if you expand the focus to include "private" suppres-
sion and if you look at what was going on in the states. As noted 
above, anti-slavery speech was suppressed both by law and pri-
vate violence in the South in the years before the Civil War. 
There were serious problems in the North as well. With the end 
of slavery, Southern laws punishing anti-slavery speech became 
moot. But in a deeper sense, the suppression of anti-slavery 
ideas lived on in the South- in the violent suppression of the 
Republican party and of political activity by blacks after Recon-
struction. In one form or another, this repression of political 
rights continued until the 1960s. One hundred and thirty years is 
a long time before a bounce back. From this larger perspective, 
the 80-20 free speech repression ratio is less accurate. 
Still, as Professor Stone notes, our record of admitting past 
mistakes (in calmer times) has been impressive. 
The Sedition Act of 1798 has been condemned in the "court 
of history," Lincoln's suspensions of habeas corpus were de-
clared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Ex parte 
Milligan, the Court's own decisions upholding the World War 
I prosecutions of dissenters were all later effectively over-
ruled, and the internment of Japanese Americans during 
World War II has been the subject of repeated government 
apologies and reparations. Likewise, the Court's decision in 
Dennis upholding convictions of the leaders of the Commu-
nist Party has been discredited, the loyalty programs and leg-
islative investigations of that era have all been condemned, 
and the efforts of the U.S. government to "expose, disrupt 
and otherwise neutralize" anti-war activities during the Viet-
nam War have been denounced by Congress and the Depart-
ment of Justice (p. 529). 
On Christmas day, 1921 President Harding pardoned 
Eugene Debs and twenty-one others who had been convicted of 
speech crimes during World War I, and President Coolidge later 
released the remaining prisoners. Senator Borah, who had 
worked for pardons said, "I am delighted that a President of the 
United States has discovered the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution and has had the courage to announce the discovery" (p. 
232). This record of apology is impressive, but there are always 
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doubters whose views of these events are likely to gain greater 
support in times of stress.21 
We have, in comparatively recent years, done a fine job of 
recognizing past mistakes. The recognitions may reflect long-
term learning. Or they may reflect the transitory triumph of a 
more civil libertarian tradition. Professor Stone is optimistic, and 
I hope he is right. In the end, as he notes, civil liberty will be se-
cure only to the extent that the values it reflects are internalized 
and demanded by the American people. Books such as Perilous 
Times can help to advance that goal. 
21. See, e.g., Jim Schlosser, Groups Call on Coble to Resign Chair, GREENSBORO 
NEWS & RECORD, Feb. 8, 2003, at 8-1, describing Representative Howard Coble's recent 
defense of the internment of the Japanese. 
